Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1984

State of Utah v. Timothy and Mildred Lairby : Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Lairby, No. 18998 (1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4529

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18998

TIMOTHY and MILDRED LAIRBY,
Defendants-Appellants.:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE ,TUDGMENTS RENDERED IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE
HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE,
PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attnrney General
DAVE B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

TIMOTfc!Y LAIRBY
Pro Se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

>TATE

OF

IJTAH,

Plrtintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 1899fl

TIMOTHY and MILDRED LAIRBY,
Defendants-Appellant.s.:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE ,TUDGMENTS RENDERED IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE
HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE,
PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attoi:-ney Genei:-al
DAVE B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attoi:-ney Genei:-al
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attoi:-neys foi:- Respondent

TIMOTHY LAIRBY
Pro Se
P.O. Rox 250
Draper-, Utah 84020

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
POINT VIII

POINT IX

POINT X

POINT XI

Page

THE ADMISSION OF ONLY A PORTION OF A
LETTER WRITTEN BY TIMOTHY LAIRBY WAS
PROPER • • • • . • . • • . . •

17

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO INCLUDE REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OR IN ITS PHRASING OF
THE INSTRUCTION IT ULTIMATELY
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY . • • . • .

18

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT, AND
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL • • • .

21

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS.

23

CONCLUSION.

26
CASES CITED

Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975) • •

14

Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957),
Cert. denied 355 U.S. 873 (1957). • • • • • •

15

Fisher v. State, Okl. Cr., 483 P.2d 1162 (1971)

6

Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970)

16

Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 207 A.2d 83 (19fi5)

14

.

Massey v. People, 179 Colo. 167, 498 P.2d 953 (1972).
People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 99 Cal. Rptr.
498 (1971). • • •
• ••••••••••

6
13, 14

People v. Muni Ct., 143 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1978)

14

Smith v. State, Md., 328 A.2d 274 (1974) • •

18

State v. Ashley, Fla. App., 393 So. 2d 1168 (1981).

11

State v. Barton, 79 N.M. 70, 439 P.2d 719 (1968).

-ii-

•

6

Cases Cited (Cont inuerl)
Page
State v. Goodman, 207 Kan. 155, 48 3 P.2d 1040 ( 1971).

15

State v. Hall, Utah, 6 71 P.2d 201 ( 1983).

6, 7, 16

State v. Howell, Utah, 6 49 P.2d 91 ( 19 82)

26

State v. Jones, Utah, 6 57 P.2d 126 3 ( 19 82).

8

State v. Kereckes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 ( 1980)
State v. Knill, Utah, 6 56 P.2d 10 26 ( 19 82).

23
.9, 19

State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 ( 1980).

,
p .2d
State v. Lesley, Utah,
- - Slip Opin. No. 18 0 38,
fl led September 14, 1983.

23
6

State v. Mccardle, Utah, 6 52 P. 2d 94 2 ( 1982).

26

State v. Mccumber, Utah, 62 2 p, 2d 353 ( 1980).

17

State v. Minnish, Utah, 560 p, 2d 340 (1977)

19

State v. Mitchell, Utah, 671 p, 2d 213 (1983).

8

State v. Moosman, Utah, 54 2 p, 2d 1093 ( 1975).

11

State v. Murphy, Utah,
filed October 31,

P.2d

-- ,

Slip Opin. No. 18814,
24, 26

State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983).

23

State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 377, 482 P.2d 241, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1015 (1971). • • • • • • • • •
13
State v. Ricci, Utah, 655 P.2d 690 (1982)

19

State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 257, 517 P.2d 1315 (1974)

14

State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965)

20

State v. Sparks, Utah,
filed October 14,

P.2d
••

, Slip Opin. No. 18780,

10

State v. Stewart, Ariz. App., 641 P.2d 895 (1982)

15

State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966) • •

14

-iii-

Cases Cited (Contineud)
Page
State v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P. 2d llS

( 19 82)

1 ()

State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 5 06 P. 2d 67 ( 19 73)
State v. Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 362 ( 19 80)

1 ()
20,

21

State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 6 57 P.2d 28 9 ( 19 82).

R

State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 6 49 P.2d 727 ( 19 82)

7

United States v. Grote, 632 F. 2d 38 7 (5th Cir. 19 80) ,
cert. denied, 454 u.s. 819, reh. denied, 4 54 U.S.
1129 ( 1981)

6

Williams v. Florida, 399

u.s.

78 ( 1969)

16

STATUTES CITED
Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann.

Utah Code Ann.

13-4 09 2 ( 19 56), as amended

76-5-402 ( 19 53) , as amended

15
.1, 21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 ( 1953) , as amended

.1, 21,

25

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 ( 19 53) , as amended

.1,

24,

25

21,

2'i

Utah Code Ann.

76-5-407 ( 19 53), as amended

Utah Code Ann.

77-l-6(f)

( 19 53).

9

Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-3 ( 19 53) , as amended.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

c) ( 1953) ,
" 77-35-7(
77-35-9(d).
.

"'

as amended

15
12
16

77-35-12(b)(l).

16, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(4).

16, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12( d)

( 19 53) , as amended.

16, 17

Utah Code Ann.

( 19 53) , as amended.

12, 13

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann.

"'
§

77-35-14(h)

77-35-23 ( 19 53), as amended

-iv-

22

Statutes Cited

(Continued)
Page

Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

(i

77-35-24 ( 19'i3), as ameooed

22

78-46-'i (Supp. 1983) • • • •

15

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Art.

10, Utah Constitution • • • •

United States Constitution, amendment VI.

9
9

Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence

17

Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence

17' 18

Rule 63 ( 28), Utah Rules of Evidence.

-v-

19

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18998

TIMOTHY and MILDRED LAIRBY,
Defendants-Appellants.:
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Timothy Lairby, was charged with one
count of rape, a first degree felony,
§

under Utah Code Ann.

76-5-402 (1953), as amended; two counts of forcible sexual

abuse, a third degree felony,

under Utah Code Ann.

76-5-404

(1953), as amended; and two counts of forcible sodomy, a first
degree felony,

under Utah Code Ann.

76-5-403 (1953), as

amended.
Appellant, Mildred Lairhy, was charged with one
count of forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-404 (1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a jury trial on October 27, 28, 29 and
November 1, 1982 in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge,
presiding, Timothy Lairby was found guilty of rape, both
counts of forcible sexual abuse, and one count of forcible
sodomy.

He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term

of five years to life for rape, two indeterminate terms not to
exceed five years for forcible sexual abuse, and a term of
five years to life for forcible sodomy -- the sentences to run
concurrently. Mildred Lairby was found guilty as charged and
placed on probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgements and sentences of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 14, 1981, appellant Mildred R. Lairby was
arrested for sexual abuse of her four-year-old step-daughter,
Virginia M. Lairby ("Lisa")

(R. 6).

occurred on April 18, 1981.

The victimization

Subsequent investigation by

Officer Guy Blunck of the Salt Lake City Police Department
resulted in the arrest of appellant Timothy M. Lairby on July
22, 1981, for sex crimes involving both his four-year old
natural daughter, Virginia Lairby, and his eight-year-old
step-daughter, Carri A. Long.

Carri is Mildred Lairby's

natural daughter.
Wanda Lairby, Virginia Lairby's natural mother, was
divorced from Timothy Lairby on December 10, 1980.

Wanda

retained temporary custody of their children and appellant
Timothy Lairby was granted visitation rights each Saturday
from noon to six p.m. and from Friday at six p.m. until Sunday
at six p.m. on the third weekend of each month (R. 373).

It

was during these weekend visits at appellants' home that the
-2-

sexual abuse of Virginia occurred.

Carri Long was residing

with Mildred and Timothy when she was victimized.
At her own home following her visit with her father
on April 19, 1981, Virginia complained to Wanda Lairby that
her "privates" hurt (R. 178).

Virginia testified that her

priv&tes began to hurt after she slipped and fell onto her
bottom in the tub while taking a bath and that the pain
reminded her of what Mildred had done to her during Virginia's
most recent visit (R. 210, 270).

Virginia repeatedly

testified that Mildred Lairby stuck a fork in her privates (R.
166, 179, 217, 221, 229, 248, 277) in the bathroom of Timothy
and Mildred's home (R. 164, 178, 217) on Easter 1981 (R. 166).
Although there is some confusion as to which end of the fork
Mildred used, (R. 223, 224), Virginia was emphatic on both
direct and cross-examination that Mildred used a fork (R. 166,
179, 217, 221, 229, 248, 277).

Virginia further testified

that the fork caused her to bleed so that she had to wash the
blood out of her panties (R. 167, 168, 275) and that Mildred
put an ice cube on her privates to stop the bleeding (R. 168),
telling her that she would give her candy to forget the
incident (R. 169).

Moreover, Virginia stated that Timothy

Lairby was present on this occasion and that he helped Mildred
hurt her (R. 154, 215, 217, 248).
Wanda Lairby testified that when Virginia told her
of

incident on April 19th she wanted to take Virginia to

the hospital for an examination, but was unable to do so until

-3-

April 20th as she lackec'l transportation (R.
401)

•

177, 378, 189,

Dr. Elmo Grewell, the examining physician on April

20th, testified that redness existed around the mucous
membrane of Virginia's vagina, but he was unable to
categorically state that molestation had taken place (R. 124).
With regard to Timothy Lairby, Virginia testified
generally that Timothy hurt her several times (R. 161).
Virginia was unable to precisely state the various dates that
he hurt her, but she referred to dates shortly before Easter
1981 (R. 166).

Notwithstanding her inability to cite specific

dates, Virginia had seen appellant's penis (R. 158), she knew
its anatomical location (R. 158), she drew it for defense
counsel

( R.

202), she remembered appellant's penis as being

hard when it touched her (R. 169), and she vividly recalled
that she was hurt (and criec'l) when appellant's penis touched
inside her vagina (R. 161, 268, 274).

Furthermore, Virginia

made graphic references to the seminal emission from
appellant's penis, describing it as a yellow-brown mix (R.
265) and stating that appellant's penis had "puked" all over
her privates so that she had to wash it off herself (R. 171).
Virginia also recounted another episode when Timothy
Lairby touched her privates with his finger, which she stated,
"felt very awful"

(R. 15R, 159, 205).

Virginia tol<l of yet

another incident when Timothy Lairby had sucke<l her privates
in the bathroom of his residence (R. 177, 17q, 269).
Dr. William Palmer, a member of the Child Protection
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Team of the

of Utah and Primary Children's Medical

Center, examined Virginia in May of 1981 (R. 321), and it was
his expert opinion that she was a victim of sexual abuse (R.
335).

The other victim in the instant case, Carri A. Lang,

also testified that she was sexually abused by Timothy Lairby.
As previously mentioned, Carri is the natural daughter of
Mildred Lairby and was living with appellants when she was
victimized (R. 462).
Carri testified that she too had seen appellant's
penis (R. 466), on one occasion when Virginia was in the room
(R. 465), and on another when she observed appellant hold his
penis with his fist (R. 469, 520-521).

She also testified

that on the weekend following her March 15th birthday,
appellant laid her on a bed, pulled off her pants and
underwear, exposed himself to her, and then touched her vagina
(R. 474-478).

Moreover, Carri testified that two weeks after

her birthday, appellant removed her clothes again and
proceeded to touch the inside of her vagina with a plastic
object (R. 482-483).

The transcript indicates that Carri was

visibly upset on the stand and at one point during the
proceedings visibly wept when counsel asked if she had seen
Timothy Lairby's privates (R. 517).
Timothy Lairby was denied further visitation rights
after April 20, 1981 and subsequent to his arrest on July 22,
1981, Carri and Virginia were placed in foster care (R. 533).
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POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO
THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARRESTS.
Appellants contend that there was no probable cause
for their arrests, as evidenced by the inadequacies in the
informations and the warrants issued for their arrests.
However, it is generally held that a defendant's failure to
object to the legality of his arrest prior to trial
constitutes a waiver of that issue.

See, e.g. United States

v. Grote, 532 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
819, reh. denied., 454 u.s. 1129 (1981); Massey v. People, 179
Colo. 167, 498 P.2d 953 (1972); Fisher v. State, Okl. Cr., 483
P.2d 1162 (1971); State v. Barton, 79 N.M. 70, 439 P.2d 719
(1968).

This waiver rule should apply to appellants, who made

no obejection prior to (or even during) trial to the legality
of their arrests.

This Court should accordingly refuse to

consider the issue on appeal.

such a ruling would be

cons is tent with procedural rules already in place which
require timely objections to defects in indictments and
informations, and to the adm iss ib i 1 i ty of evidence seized
incident to an allegedly unlawful arrest.

See Rule 12(b),

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Hall, Utah, 671
P.2d 201, 202; State v. Lesley, Utah,
No. 18038, filed September 14, 1983.
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P. 2d

, Slip Opin.

POINT II
BECAUSE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT, EITHER
BEFORE OR DURING TRIAL, TO ANY ALLEGED
DEFECTS IN THE INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST
THEM, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THAT
ISSUE ON APPEAL.
ALTERNATIVELY, THOSE
INFORMATIONS SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE LAW.
Appellants contend that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because the informations filed against them were
mistitled and not signed by a prosecuting attorney.
Rule 12(b)(l) and

Under

(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,l a

defendant waives any objections to defects in an information
unless he objects to the information either before or during
trial.

State v. Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 201 (1983).

Because

appellants failed to comply with Rule 12(b)(l), they are
precluded from raising the issue of defective informations on
appeal.

Moreover, the informations filed against appellants

met all the legal requirements recently outlined by this Court
in State, ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 646 P.2d 727 (1982).

POINT III
BECAUSE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PROVIDED THIS
COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD OF THEIR
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS, THIS COURT CANNOT
RULE ON APPELLANTS' ALLEGATIONS OF ERR:>R
AT THOSE HEARINGS.
Appellants make several allegations of prejudicial
error at their preliminary hearings.

1 Utah Code Ann.

To support these

77-35-12(b){l) and (d) (1953)
-7-

allegations, appellants refer to uncertified, partial
transcripts of their preliminary hearings (see attachment to
Appellants' Brief after p. 77).

On

the title pages of the

transcripts appellants state that the master tapes of those
hearings have been erased by the Fifth Circuit Court as part
of their normal procedure.
As noted in State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263
( 1982):
The burden of showing error is on the
party who seeks to upset the judgment.
the absence of record evidence to the
contrary, we assume regularity in the
proceedings below, and affirm the
judgment.
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 1267.

In

The rationale for this position is given in

State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289 (1982):
When a defendant predicates error to this
Court, he has the duty and responsibility
of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record. Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as
a unilateral allegation which the review
court has no power to determine.
This
Court simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon
alleged facts unsupported by the record.
See State v. Jones (1982), 657 P.2d 1263,
and cases cited therein.
See also McBride
v. State , Alaska, 368 P.2d 925, 929
(1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811, 83
s.ct. 1702, lo L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1963).
Id. at 293.
(1983).

See also State v. Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213

The preliminary hearing transcripts provided by

appellants simply are not an adequate record to support their
allegations of error, even in the face of appellants'
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unsubstantiated claim that the master tapes of their
preliminary hearings have been destroyed.

Accordingly,

appellants' assignments of error cannot be considered by this
Court.
POINT IV
APPELLANTS WERE NOT DENIED THE RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL, NOR WAS TIMOTHY LAIRBY'S
PRELIMINARY HEARING UNLAWFULLY DELAYED.
Appellants claim that they were denied their
constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the fifteen to
seventeen month delay between the dates of their arrests and
their trial.

They argue that this delay resulted in the

imposition of punishment before trial and was improperly used
by the prosecution to coach certain child witnesses who would
eventually testify at trial.
The Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee
criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial.
amend. VI; Utah Const. art.

12.

U.S. Const.

The right is also

guaranteed by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-l-6(f) (1953).

As noted by

this Court in State v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026 (1982):
Whether the federal right
[to a speedy
trial] as been violated is determined by
balancing the "[l]ength of delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514,530, 92 s.ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed. 2d
101 (1972).
Similar considerations also
apply under the Utah Constitution. State
v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115, 116
(1982); State v. Hafen, Utah, 593 P.2d
538, 541 (1979); State v. Giles, Utah, 576
P.2d 876, 879 (1978).
Id. at 1029.
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Because neither appellant asserted his

to a speedy trial

in the lower court, their claim that they were denied that
right is foreclosed from consideration by this Court.
State v. Sparks, Utah,

P.2d

See

, Slip Opin. No. 18780 P.3,

filed October 14, 1983.
Even if appellants had not waived this issue, they
were not harmed by the delays in bringing their cases to trial
and, therefore, cannot claim error.

The purposes behind

statutes protecting the constitutional right to a speedy trial
are to prevent an accused from being held in custody for
unreasonable periods of time absent a determination of guilt
by an impartial tribunal and to prevent law enforcement
officials from holding undisposed charges over the head of a
prisoner.

State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 147, 506 P.2d 67,

68 (1973); State v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (1982).
These abuses are manifested only when a defendant is in
custody.

In the instant case, both appellants were granted

pretrial release, and thus were not harmed by the delay in
that way.
Furthermore, this court in Velasquez said that a
defendant who acts to delay the disposition of pending charges
has indicated "his willingness to temporarily waive [the]
protection [of the constitutional right to a speedy trial]."
In this situation, •the purpose behind the statute . • • no
longer exists."

641 P.2d at 116.

The record indicates that

every continuation of appellants' trial dates was based either
on the state's motion as stipulated to by appellants, or on a
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defense motion (see R. 32, 13, 34, 37, 43, 53-55, 62, 72,
78).2

It is well-settled that:
The granting of a continuance of a case is
a matter resting in the sound discretion
of the trial judge, and that discretion
will not be interfered with on appeal
except where the court clearly abused its
discretion in the matter.
Thompson v.
United States, 372 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1957); United States v. Green, 497 F.2d
1068 (7th Cir. 1974).

State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1975).

Under

these circumstances, appellants cannot now claim that they
were denied a speedy trial.
Timothy Lairby makes the additional argument that
the delay between his initial appearance in the circuit court
and his preliminary hearing was unreasonable and without good
cause.

The record indicates that an information was filed and

an arrest warrant issued against him on July 20, 1981 (R. 4).
He was arrested on July 22, 1981 (R. 3).

A preliminary

hearing was scheduled in circuit court for July 30, 1981
(within the ten day period required by Utah Code Ann.
77-35-7(c} for defendants in custody);
stipulation of both parties, the court adjourned and the
hearing was continued to September 17, 1981 (R. 4).

According

to his brief, Mr. Lairby arranged bond after thirteen days in

2

One except ion appears in the record.
In Mildred La irby' s
case, the court, on its own motion, reset her trial date
from September 28, 1981 to February 9, 1982 (see R. 8,
20-21).
However, there is nothing to indicate that this
was an unreasonable or prejudicial delay,
-11-

custody (see Appellants' Brief at p. 21).

At that point the

thirty day and extended time period provisions of
became operative.

77-35-7(c)

The record indicates the date for

preliminary hearing was continued until January 7, 1982 by
court order based on stipulation of both parties (R. 5).
There is nothing to indicate that the court's further
continuances of the preliminary hearing date to March 11, 1982
were an abuse of discretion or prejudicial to Mr. Lairby.
Moreover, it does not appear that Mr. Lairby made any
objection to the district court concerning the alleged
unreasonable delay by the circuit court in holding a
preliminary hearing.

POINT V

APPELLANTS' , DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A
DEFENSE MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRETRIAL
DEPOSITION OF TWO POTENTIAL PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
Appellants contend that it was improper for the
trial court to deny a defense motion to compel the deposition
of two of the prosecution's potential witnesses, Carri and
Traci Long, prior to trial (R. 26-36, 39).

This contention is

based on the premise that the potential witnesses they desired
to depose were about to le ave the state and thus the is sue
would fall within the ambit of Utah Code Ann.
§

77-35-14(h)(l953), as amended, which reads:

-12-

Whenever a material witness is about to
leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as
to afford reasonable grounds for believing
that he will be unable to attend a trial
or hearing, either party may, upon notice
to the other, apply to the court for an
order that the witness be examined
conditionally by deposition.
Attendance
of the witness at the deposition may be
compelled by subpoena.
The defendant
shall be present at the deposition and the
court shall make whatever order is
necessary to effect such attendance.
Although appellants assert that the witness were about to
leave the state, they provide no factual basis for that
assertion (See Appellants' Brief at p. 28),

Moreover, while

appellants suggest in hindsight that this was the purpose of
the motion to compel, the motion itself makes no mention of
this fact (See R. 26).
not be expected to apply

Quite simply, the trial court could
77-35-14(h), since it had not been

advised at the time the motion was presented that the
witnesses were about to le ave the state.
Furthermore, criminal defendants do not enjoy an
absolute right to depose prospective prosecution witnesses.
In the absence of a state statute to the contrary, it is
generally held that a person accused of a crime in a state
court is not entitled as a matter of right to take the
depositions of prospective witnesses before trial.

See, e.g.,

State v. Ashley, Fla. App., 393 So. 2d 1168 (1981); People v.
Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 2d 267, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1971); State v.
Polsky, 82 N.M. 377, 482 P.2d 241, cert. denied 404 U.S. 1015
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( 1971),

This Court has taken a lPss restrictive approach anrl

has given the trial court the Jiscretion to grant the
deposition of prospective witnesses.

See State v. Sims, 3n

Utah 2d 257, 517 P.2d 1315 (1974).
Although this Court has not arldresserl the
constitutionality of this discretionary deposition process,
many courts have held that the denial of a motion to compel a
deposition does not violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amenrlment
due process rights.

People v. Municipal Court for Pasadena

Judicial Dist., 143 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1978); Kardy v. Shook, 237
Md. 524, 207 A.2d 83 (1965); Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443,
340 A.2d 396 (1975); State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12
( 19 66).

Nor is a de fe nda nt' s right to compulsory process

violated because he is not allowed to depose prospective
prosecution witnesses.

People v. Bowen, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 506.

The common rationale in dismissing these constitutional
challenges is that a defendant will be able to confront the
witnesses at trial and if the prosecution ultimately chooses
not to call a particular witness, a defendant certainly has
the right to call that witness in his own behalf.
When appellants discovered that the prosecution was
not going to call Traci Long, they could have called her as
their own witness.

If she was not in Utah, it was appellants'

responsibility to use the Uniform Act to compel the attenrlance
of witnesses from outside the state.

See People v. Carter, 37

N.Y. 2d 234, 333 N.E. 2d 177 (1975).

Both Arizona (where
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Traci apparently was located) and Utah have adopted the
Uniform Act.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

amended; Utah Code

§

13-4092 (1956), as

77-21-3 (1953).

I t was

appellants'

failure to implement this procedure, not something the trial
court or prosecution did or did not do, that resulted in their
inability to examine any witnesses they felt were necessary to
their defense.

In short, "[t l he duty to present a clefense

devolves upon the defendant who • • • is responsible for the
production of witnesses in his behalf."

State v. Stewart,

Ariz. App., 641 P.2d 895, 897 (1982), citing Ferrari v. United
States, 244 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
873 (1957).
1040 (1971).

See also State v. Goodman, 207 Kan. 155, 483 P.2d
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying appellants' motion to compel the
deposition of prospective prosecution witnesses.

POINT VI
IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO HAVE A JURY
COMPRISED OF EIGBT MEMBERS IN A
NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASE.
Utah Code Ann.
mandate of Art. I

§

78-46-5 (Supp. 1983) reflects the

10 of the Utah Constitution for an eight

person jury in a non-capital criminal case.

Although

appellants cite a number of United States Circuit Court of
Appeals and United States Supreme Court cases in arguing that
an eight member jury is constitutionally improper, none of the
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cited cases is applicable.

In Williams v. Florida, 399

u.s.

78 (1969), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a jury
of six persons in a criminal case is constitutional.

By

analogy, a greater number would also pass constitutional
muster.

Furthermore, in Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152

(10th Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically ruled, in light of the Williams holding, that the
eight jurors required under the Utah Constitution was
constitutional.

Appellants therefore have no valid Sixth or

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

POINT VII
APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED THE ISSUE OF
MISJOINDER OF OFFENSES AND DEFENDANTS.
Appellants argue that the single information filed
against Timothy Lairby improperly joined the several charged
offenses and that appellants were improperly joined for trial.
Rule 12(b)(l), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
requires a defendant to make a timely objection to any defects
in an information.
(1983).

See State v. Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 2n1

Rule 12(b)(4) requires a defendant to make requests

for severance of charges at least five days prior to trial.
See also Rule 9(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.3

3 Utah Code Ann.

<ii

77-35-9(d)

(1953)
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Timothy Lairby, who made no objection to the information as
required by Rule 12(b)(l) and who made no request for
severance of charges as required by Rule 12(b)(4) and Rule
9(d), has waived the right to raise the issue of misjoinder of
offenses on appeal,

See State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d

353, 355-356 (1980), interpreting former Utah Code Ann.
77-23-10 (1953), as amended,

§

Anrl, because no pretrial motion

for severance of defendants was made, appellants have waived
the issue of misjoinder of defendants at trial under Rule 9
( d) and Ru le 12 ( b) ( 4) and ( d) •
Finally, appellants knowingly and voluntarily waived
any due process right to a severance of offenses or rlefendants
when they st ip ula ted to a jo i nde r of offenses and defendants
(see R. 89-90).

Cf. State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d at 355-356.

POINT VIII
THE ADMISSION OF ONLY A PORTION OF A
LETTER WRITTEN BY TIMOTHY LAIRBY WAS
PROPER.
Appellants contend that the trial court improperly
admitted selected portions of a letter written by Timothy
Lairby and argue that the letter should only have been
admitted in its entirety.

The prosecution did not offer the

portions of the letter to prove the truth of any statement
under an exception to the hearsay rule,
Rules of Evidence.

See Rule 63, Utah

Rather, the prosecution offered the

selected portions under Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence, for
-17-

the purpose of impeaching Timothy Lairby's credibility (R.
740).

See Smith v. State, Md,, 328 A.2d 274, 279 (1974).

Since the text of the entire letter was apparently unnecessary
for puposes of impeachment, the trial court excluded the
inappropriate segments.

Later, when defense counsel attempted

to introduce these remaining segments, the trial court found
them inadmissible clearly because defense counsel did not show
how as hearsay they might fall within one of the recognized
exceptions in Rule 63, or why they shoulil be accepted for any
non-hearsay use.

POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INCLUDE REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS OR IN
ITS PHRASING OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IT
ULTIMATELY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
In Point Eighteen of their brief, appellants allege
that the trial court erred in its handling of the jury
instructions.

Appellants argue either that the court refused

to include an instruction on an issue they rleemed pertinent or
that the instruction given by the court was inaccurate,
incomplete, or patently misleading.

Appellants' contentions

regarding a defendants' theory instruction and a character
witness instruction fall into the former category, while the
burden of proof, child competency, rape, and sodomy
instructions come under the latter category.
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First, in order for this Court to consider a
defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court improperly
refused to give a proposed jury instruction, that proposed
instruction must be included in the record on appeal.
v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1982).

State

The record in the

instant case does not contain the proposed defendants• theory
and character witness intructions appellants claim were
improperly denied.

Thus, this Court cannot consider

appellants' assignments of error in that regard.
Moreover, a review of the record indicates that at
no point during the discussion in the trial court about jury
instructions did appellants make known their desire to have a
defense theory instruction given.

And, with respect to a

character witness instruction, the record clearly shows that
the trial court denied that instruction because the precise
issue of reputation for good character (a requirement of Rule
63 (28), Utah Rules of Evidence) was not established by the
testimony given at trial (see R. 784-786).

Appellants'

"character" witnesses testified about their personal feelings
concerning appellants, not about appellants' reputation for
good character (see R. 587, 610, 618, 686).

Since a character

witness instruction could not be supported by the evidence,
the trial court properly denied any such requested
instruction.

See State v. Ricci, Utah, 655 P.2d 690 (1982);

State v. Minnish, Utah, 560 P.2d 340 (1977).
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Second, with respect to appellants' assertion that
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the State's
bur<len to prove guilt beyond a reasonable aoubt, Instruction
No. 15 (R. 116) adequately advised the jury of the requisite
standara of proof.

In a<ldition to the specific "reasonable

doubt" language in paragraph three of the instruction, when
read as a whole, the primary purpose of the instruction is to
insure that the jury clearly understan<ls the concepts of
"burden" and "reasonable doubt."

With an entire instruction

devoted to this purpose, there is little doubt that the jury
was aware of the degree of proof required for conviction.
Third, appellants' contention that Instruction No.
10 (R. 111) was improper is without merit.

Citing State v.

Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 362 (1980), they argue that the
fourth line of that instruction should read "has a moral auty

to tell the truth •
tell the truth , • • • "

," rather than just "has a duty to
In quoting the standard for

competency of child witnesses from an earlier case

State

v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965), the Wilkerson
Court used the phrase "sense of moral duty • •
at 364 (emphasis added).

" 612 P. 2d

However, the significance of that

language is to emphasize that a child witness must recognize
the obligation to testify truthfully; it was not intended to
prescribe the exclusive wording to describe that obligation.
Instruction No. 10, with the word "duty" unmodified by the
word "moral," adequately informed the jury of the importance
of a child witness's recognition of his obligation to testify
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truthfully, and thus was not inconsistent with the standard
reiterated in Wilkerson.
Finally, with respect to appellants' argument that
there was some irregularity in the rape and sodomy
instructions (Nos. 17 and 18; R. 117 and 118), those
instructions expressly adhered to the requirements of Utah
Code Ann.

76-5-402 and

(1953), as amended, for

rape, and of Utah Code Ann.
sodomy.

76-5-403 (1953), as amended, for

Appellants' remaining arguments regarding the jury

instructions are pure conjecture.

POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR
ARREST OF JUDGMENT, AND MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
Appellants' contention that the trial court's denial
of their motion to dismiss was a denial of due process is
based entirely on their view that the evidence was not
sufficient to support a conviction of any of the offenses with
which they were charged.

As shown in Point XI of this brief,

substantial credible evidence supporting appellants•
convictions was introduced at trial.

Thus, the trial court

properly denied the motion to dismiss.
Appellants' claim respecting the trial court's
denial of their motion to arrest judgment is equally
unmeritorious.

Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

which provides in pertinent part:
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At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proveCl or admitted do not constitute
a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment.4
Appellants simply did not satisfy the requirements of this
rule (see their motion at R. 145-146).
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 provides in
pertinent part:
The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own---rriitiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights
of a party.
[Emphasis added. J
Appellants' motion for a new trial (see R. 161-162) failed to
establish any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon their rights.

The errors they alleged in

that motion have been addressed and disposed of as meritless
in this brief.

4 Utah Code Ann.

77-35-23 (1953)

5 Utah Code Ann.

77-35-24 (1953)
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POINT XI
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS.
The standard for appellate review of an
insufficiency of evidence claim is stated in State v. Petree,
Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983):
We review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
Id. at 444.

See also State v. Kereckes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161,

1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P,2d 229, 231 (1980).
The evidence against appellants regarding their victimization
of Virginia Lairby is as follows.

Virginia Lairby repeatedly

testified that on Easter 1981 her "privates" had been
penetrated by a fork wielded by Mildred Lairby in the bathroom
of Mildred and Timothy Lairby' s home.

On both direct and

cross-examination, Virginia asserted that she had not
fabricated the incident or been told what to say by another
(R. 52, 54, 66, 67, 106, 110, 118, 138, 168).

Although he was

unable to categorically state that moslestation had occured, a
physician who examined Virginia shortly after the incident
testified that he observed redness around the mucous membrane
-23-

of her vagina (R. 124).

This evioence is sufficient to

support appellant Mildreo Lairby's conviction of forcible
sexual abuse under Utah Code Ann. -. 76-5-404 ( 1953), as
amended, which at the time she was charged read in pertinent
part:
A person commits forcible sexual abuse
if, under circumstances not amounting to
rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or
sodomy, he touches the anus or any part of
the genitals of another or otherwise takes
indecent liberties with another, • • • ,
with intent to cause substantial emotional
or bodily pain to any person or with the
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, without the consent
of the other.
The intent required by that statute could properly be inferred
by the jury from the actions of appellant.
Murphy, Utah,

P.2d

See State v.

, Slip Opin. No. 18814 at p.4, filed

October 31, 1983.
Appellant Timothy Lairby's conviction of rape and
forcible sodomy is also amply justified in light of the
evidence adduced at trial.

He relies heavily on the

assumption that in order for Virginia to have been raped,
physical damage would have had to occur to her vaginal
tissues.

Appellant speculates as to the physiological

consequences of the rape of a small child without any
evidentiary basis for his conclusions.

On direct and

cross-examination, Virginia testified that she knew the shape
aoo size of an adult male's penis by observing Timothy's
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(R.

158) and that Timothy's penis was hard and that it hurt when
it touched inside her vagina (R. 161, 169, 205, 251, 268,
274).

Virginia also vividly described how Timothy's emission

had "puked" all over her so that she had to wash it off
herself (R. 265, 171).

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-407 (1953), as

amended, states that "any sexual penetration" is sufficient
for rape, and Virginia testified that she was certain
Timothy's penis had touched inside her vagina (R. 161, 205).
Virginia al so told of a not her time when Timothy "sucked" her
privates in the bathroom of his residence (R. 177).

Utah Code

Ann. S 76-5-403 (1953), as amended, defines first degree
forcible sodomy as a sexual act involving the genitals of one
person am the mouth or anus of another person under the age
of 14, without the other's consent.

Again, there is clear and

undisputed evidence based on Virginia's testimony that Timothy
made oral contact with her genitals, obviously without her
consent.
Futhermore, the evidence was sufficient to support
appellant Timothy Lairby's conviction for the forcible sexual
abuse of his step-daughter, Carri Lang.

Carri testified that

on approximately March 22, 1981, appellant laid her on a bed,
pulled down her pants and fondled her genitals (R. 474-479).
This uncontradicted evidence could easily support the jury's
conclusion that appellant was guilty of forcible sexual abuse
under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-404 (1953), as amended.

Again,

the jury could properly infer the intent required by that
-25-

statute fran appellant's actions.

See State v. Murphy.

In conclusion, an appellate court will only overturn
a verdict challenged on insufficieny of the evidence "when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man
could not possibly have reached a vercl ict beyond a reasonable
doubt."

State v. Mccardle, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).

It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence;
that an appellate court might view the evidence as less than
wholly conclusive is not sufficient to overturn a verdict on
appeal.

State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).

Because the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, was not sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that the jury must have
entertained a reasonable cloubt that appellants were guilty of
the crimes with which they were charged, appellants'
insufficiency of evidence claim should be rejected and their
convictionsshould be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Respondent has endeavored to respond to every point
in appellants' pro se brief that it believes merits a
response. Based upon the foregoing, the judgments and
sentences of the trial court should be affirmed.
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